Trusted Execution Environment is an execution environment that resides in connected devices and ensures that sensitive data are stored, processed, and protected isolated from general-purpose OS such as Android. The TrustZone TEE solution can achieve a medium protection level with comparatively low cost, so it is widely used. However, related researches show that the TrustZone TEE solution has security defects; for example, hardware isolation provided by TrustZone is insufficient. In this paper, we propose a security enhancement scheme based on TEE. According to the existing problems in the TrustZone TEE scheme, a corresponding protection mechanism is established to fully enhance the reliability of connected devices. In our scheme, TEE is used alongside other security technology such as secure elements and microkernel and kernel real-time protection to provide multi-layered defense mechanisms. In our scheme, we introduce a security element as the root of trust (ROT) of connected devices. The secure element is used to store sensitive data such as the first-stage bootloader, various secret keys, and the certificate of the second-stage bootloader. The secure element is also used to execute sensitive operations such as encryption and decryption.
Background
With the increasingly powerful computing capacity of connected devices represented by mobile phones, tablet computers, set-top boxes, automotive infotainment systems, and smart-TV, more and more services are available on connected devices, and have become indispensable to users. At present, the proportion of connected devices based on Android has exceeded 80% in global sales, taking an absolute leading position. Android is an open-source operating system based on Linux kernel. Android was jointly developed and improved by a large number of developers because of its openness. It provides powerful features and a rich software ecosystem, but its security flaws are also obvious.
The first is that Linux kernel components, including drivers, all run in kernel mode. There are no isolation measures between kernel components. Attackers can use kernel defects to achieve the purpose of modifying the contents of the kernel memory space, thereby bypassing the kernel security mechanism [1] . Second, extended function modules can be loaded dynamically and run in kernel mode. This monolithic architecture brings performance advantages as well as reliability concerns [2] . Last but not the least, both Linux kernel and Android have inherent security mechanism flaws in application permission management [3] [4] , which makes the platform easy to suffer from attacks such as application layer privilege escalation. Therefore, the security threats of viruses, Trojans, and malware on the Android platform are very serious, and there is no effective solution. Developers are required to devote much effort to protect software from malicious attackers. However, there are still numerous security incidents every year [5] .
Nowadays, connected devices process a wide range of personal and private information of a sensitive nature, such as biometric identifiers, payment data, and cryptographic keys. It has become clear that strong security guarantees are necessary to ensure the sustainability of connected devices' ecosystem. However, in current circumstances, Android is difficult to replace in a short time. In order to ensure the security of connected devices, the industry has applied a variety of technologies, two of which are widely used. One of them is traditional security technology implemented with Secure Element (abbreviated as SE), which is a security component that comprises autonomous, tamper-resistant hardware within which secure applications and their confidential cryptographic data (e.g. key management) are stored and executed. Secure Element allows for high levels of security but limited functionality, because of poor hardware resources. The lack of SE hardware resources makes it difficult to adapt to the more complex security business logic in the connected devices. In order to solve this problem, Global Platform put forward the Trusted Execution Environment (abbreviated as TEE) specification. Global Platform is a nonprofit organization that creates and publishes specifications for secure chip technology. A TEE is an execution environment that resides in connected devices and ensures that sensitive data are stored, processed and protected isolated from general-purpose OS such as Android. As mentioned above, the general-purpose OS and its applications are considered untrustworthy. TEE provides isolated capabilities for secure execution of authorized security software and provides end-to-end security by ensuring confidentiality, authenticity, privacy, system integrity, and data access rights [6] .
According to TEE specification, both the general-purpose OS and the applications above it run in an environment called the Rich OS Application Environment (abbreviated as REE), which has its own hardware resources. Applications in REE are called Client Applications (abbreviated as CA). TEE is independent of REE, and TEE also has its own hardware resources. The operating system running in TEE is called trusted OS or TEE OS, and applications running on it are called Trusted Applications (abbreviated as TA). The trusted OS provides security services to trusted applications such as trusted storage and encryption/decryption operation. The code execution in REE and TEE is isolated, and both the general-purpose OS and client applications cannot access TEE's hardware resources [7] (as shown in Figure 1(a) ). 
Related Work

TEE Solution based on ARM TrustZone Technology
The TEE solution used in connected devices consists of four parts: hardware-based isolation technology, trusted boot, trusted OS, and a general-purpose OS driver. Arm processors are widely used in connected devices, occupying a dominant position in the market. Arm TrustZone technology provides system-wide hardware isolation for trusted OS. The isolation is achieved by partitioning all of the SoC's hardware resources and peripherals, so that they exist in one of two worlds: the secure world for TEE (security subsystem) and the normal/non-secure world for everything else. Those sensitive hardware resources that need protection can be put in the secure world. As its name implies, the secure world must remain protected against any attacks launched by normal world. To do so, several security policies are enforced by hardware logic implemented in Arm processor cores and AMBA bus interface that prevents the normal world from accessing the secure world's resources. Furthermore, as the current security state is accessible on the system bus, peripherals on the SoC can be designated to either world by simply sampling this value. TrustZone enables a single physical processor core to safely and efficiently execute code from both the 'normal world' and the 'secure world' in a time-sliced fashion. Each physical processor core provides two virtual cores, one considered 'non-secure' and the other 'secure', plus a mechanism to robustly context switch between them. The security state is encoded on the system bus, and this enables trivial integration of the virtual processors into the system security mechanism. The non-secure core can access normal world system resources only, while the secure core can access all system resources [8] . A typical hardware platform based on ARM TrustZone technology is shown in Figure 1 At present, all Arm Cortex-A and the latest Cortex-M23 and Cortex-M33 based systems can support TrustZone, from the smallest of microcontrollers to high-performance applications processors. ARM TrustZone technology can simplify and standardize the TEE solution. TrustZone removes the need for a dedicated security processor or security component, which simplifies hardware design. TrustZone also provides high performance and capability to large amounts of memory to the secure world, and it allows powerful security software containing trusted OS and trusted applications to run alongside general-purpose OS and its applications [9] . In the Android ecosystem, major TEE solutions such as Qualcomm's QSEE and Trustonic's Kinibi are based on TrustZone. These TEE solutions can be called TrustZone TEEs, which means the hardware platforms are ARM SoCs which support ARM TrustZone technology. General-purpose OS and client applications are put in the normal world with trusted OS and trusted applications, and their code execution and hardware resources are isolated by the mechanism mentioned above (as shown in Figure 2(a) ). Considering that system boot is a time point when systems are often attacked, many attackers utilize the opportunity of device power-on to modify system images in Flash or the boot mode. If there is no boot system to check the image integrity and the boot mode, the device will be broken through [10] . ARM Secure boot standards introduce the concept of trust chains. In other words, the modules installed later must be authenticated by the previous ones. The digital signature authentication mechanism can be used for image integrity check.
Lastly, in order for the normal world to be able to interact with the secure world and the applications within it, the authors of the TEE must also provide a user library (TEE client API library) and kernel driver (TrustZone driver) for general-purpose OS.
Threat Model to TrustZone TEE Solution
TrustZone TEE solution can achieve a medium protection level with comparatively low cost. However, related studies still show a great issue of reliability existing in this scheme. TrustZone TEE solution has the following defects: 1) Hardware isolation provide by TrustZone is not enough. The isolation is reflected in three aspects: time-share isolation of processor resources, addressing isolation of memory resources, and file system isolation of storage resources. It can be found that TEE is not isolated from REE with respect to physical device, and their isolation is only reflected in software and hardware configuration [11] . Commonly, connected devices only have one flash device. Trusted OS, trusted applications, and sensitive data stored in TEE actually exist in the flash device's special partition while REE is stored in another partition. Therefore, it is easy for trusted OS or sensitive data to be cracked, disturbed, or replaced. For instance, the attacker uses special hardware device to read all partitions of the flash device and analyze it.
2) It is relatively weak for the protective capability of TrustZone against side-channel attack and physical attack. Through side-channel attack, it is possible for sensitive data (key, plaintext, etc.) that are operated by sensitive operations (encrypt, decrypt, etc.) in trusted applications to be cracked or disturbed [12] .
3) Both trusted OS and bootloader may have security vulnerabilities. Besides the basic functions of an operating system such as schedule and memory management, trusted OS must realize the function and the application interface defined in TEE specification. Trusted OS needs both expandability (needs to support the operation of different trusted applications) and interactivity (needs to interact with the REE). At present, TEE specifications are under development, and more and more features are integrated into TEE. Increased complexity of trusted OS increases the likelihood of system vulnerabilities [13] .
Because connected devices are permanently connected, they are prone to security attacks from the outside (network) and the inside (user). In addition, they contain a lot of sensitive information about their owners and for third parties. As a result, the security stakes are very high: the benefit for attackers can be substantial, and stakeholders can incur serious losses [14] . Not surprisingly, an increasing number of security attacks on TEE are being reported, and many more are bound to occur. Researches show that the current attacks on TEE mainly include the following modes: 1) Physical attack: At present, common physical attacks include obtainment of plaintext by direct scanning of physical memory, cold boot attack by utilizing stored data residue, and reading of chip data with a microscope. Trustzone cannot defend against physical attacks. For instance, Muller and other researchers obtained the hard disk secret key in a Samsung Galaxy Nexus mobile phone through a FROST attack [10] . In addition, RAM and the storage addressing range can be altered by the JTAG debugging interface, and such alteration can achieve the purpose of illegal data access [15] . The tapping of signals on the SOC data bus using a physical probe is also a type of physical attack [16] .
2) Side-channel attack: Side-channel attacks are based on information obtained from the physical implementation of the cryptosystem rather than brute force methods or theoretical weaknesses in the algorithm. For example, time information, power consumption, electromagnetic leakage, or even sound can provide an additional source of information, which can be exploited to further crack the system. Side-channel attacks are characterized by low cost, convenient execution, and high attack efficiency [17] . In the TrustZone TEE scheme, sensitive operations are executed in the secure world, and this mechanism is comparatively weak for prevention against side-channel attacks and can easily be cracked or disturbed [18] .
3) System vulnerabilities attack: As mentioned above, general-purpose OS, trusted OS, and bootloader may have security vulnerabilities. Attackers can utilize vulnerabilities to bypass security mechanisms to achieve the purpose of executing illegal code or illegally accessing data. For instance, the secure boot authentication process in some connected devices may be bypassed by exploiting certain defects in the system boot code [19] . Another example is that, according to the TEE specification, a large amount of data sharing between TEE and REE can only be achieved through a shared memory mechanism between a legal CA and a legal TA. However, how to implement the share memory mechanism is out of the scope of TEE specification. In order to simplify the development and offer basic security mechanism, the share memory mechanism is usually implemented in the TrustZone driver. However, attackers can use generic OS defects to inject code into the TrustZone driver so that the shared memory mechanism's permission restrictions can be bypassed. Different device manufacturers have different implementations of the shared memory mechanism, so attackers can use the weaknesses of vendors' implementations to steal data [20] .
Our Work
Taking the above-mentioned factors into consideration, the TrustZone TEE solution has security defects and attackers are constantly improving their attack methods. In this paper, we propose a security enhancement scheme based on TEE. According to the existing problems in the TrustZone TEE scheme, a corresponding protection mechanism is established to fully enhance the reliability of connected devices. In our scheme, TEE is used alongside other security technology such as secure elements and microkernel and kernel real-time protection to provide multi-layered defense mechanisms (as shown in Figure 2(b) ). In our scheme, we introduce a security element (SE) as the root of trust (ROT) of connected devices. The secure element is used to store sensitive data such as the first-stage bootloader, various secret keys, and the certificate of the second-stage bootloader. The secure element is also used to execute sensitive operations such as encryption and decryption.
System boot is a time point when systems are often attacked. Although secure boot is adopted in the TrustZone TEE solution, the code to implement the secure boot procedure is stored in the unprotected flash device and is therefore easily broken or replaced. In 2013, the bootloader of some Moto mobile phones was cracked, and the bootloader could be unlocked to load any system [21] . Recently, malware developers turned their attention to the firmware that runs before the operating system, leading to the creation of attack codes known as rootkits and bootkits. Rootkits and bootkits are entities that are not part of the original firmware but instead insert themselves into the firmware layer. They blend in, making them virtually untraceable. A firmware rootkit has to go through "kernel-land" to reach the firmware layer. Obtaining full access to the hardware, the malware can do nearly anything it wants from erasing hard drives to logging keystrokes and quietly sending information to far-off destinations [22] .
In our scheme, the first-stage bootloader is stored in the secure element instead of stored in an unprotected flash device. The secure element can ensure its content cannot be illegally accessed and analyzed [23] . The secure element can be connected to the ARM SoC through SPI bus, and most present secure element chips can support this interface. The current mainstream ARM SoC is designed to operate in the secure world after being powered on or reset. In addition, the boot mode of the ARM SoC can be configured by special settings such as the voltage of the specific pin input or eFUSE configurations. In this way, the boot device of the ARM SoC can be configured as a SPI flash device. Our software in the secure element can emulate a SPI flash device driver after the SE is powered on or reset. This allows the ARM SoC to read the first-stage bootloader from the secure element and then hand over the system control to it. After the first-stage boot loader is executed, the multi-level secure boot process that covers the device life cycle begins.
In the TrustZone TEE solution, cryptographic operations are implemented in the Trusted OS using a software algorithm library. In essence, it is still a software running on a secure processor core. According to the previous analysis, the TrustZone's defense capability against physical attacks and side-channel attacks is insufficient. Therefore, sensitive operations such as encryption and decryption in TEE have a certain risk of being compromised. However, the secure element can effectively prevent physical attacks and side-channel attacks. Therefore, in our scheme, sensitive operations in TEE are operated in the secure element. These sensitive operations consist of encryption, decryption, key storage, certificate authentication, and so on.
Many existing trusted OSs have system security defects especially in code responsible for TEE and REE interactions and in trusted device drivers. In 2015, the Samsung Galaxy S5 mobile phone found a hidden danger of fingerprint identification. The S5 fingerprint identification system in TEE was used to save and encrypt fingerprint data, but in April 2015, it discovered that its trusted OS had system defects. After the kernel is being rooted, the attacker can directly access the fingerprint device to obtain a fingerprint and then disguise it as a user with such a fingerprint [24] . According to TEE specification, trusted OS is based on monolithic kernel architecture, which means that all trusted OS components including TEE framework, TEE internal API function, TEE socket API function, and trusted device drivers are operated under the kernel mode. There is no quarantine measure between these components. The advantage is high performance, but there are obvious shortages as well. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, more and more functions have been integrated into TEE, and the complexity of the trusted operating system has also been increased. The increasing complexity of the trusted OS will increase the likelihood of system vulnerabilities. Secondly, the device driver usually needs to handle interruptions and access kernel memory, and failure on these operations could lead to system collapse [25] . This scheme fully referred to the design thought of microkernel, innovatively realizing a new architecture trusted OS. Based on microkernel architecture, the trusted OS is divided into three parts: privileged mode trusted OS kernel (including necessary system functions, such as instruction execution, memory management, and IPC), non-privileged mode system services, and trusted device drivers. Both system services and device drivers are non-privileged mode threads on the trusted OS kernel, and the kernel provides the isolation between threads. Simplification of the privileged mode code and isolation between various components of the trusted OS effectively improve the reliability of the operating system [26] .
As mentioned earlier, a general-purpose OS driver named TrustZone driver is responsible for the communication between CA and TA. The share memory mechanism is also often implemented in the TrustZone driver. Therefore, the TrustZone driver has become a key security factor, but attackers can use generic OS defects to inject code into TrustZone driver or other kernel code to bypass the security mechanism offered by the Linux kernel. In our scheme, the integrity of the Linux kernel image, which includes the TrustZone driver, is guaranteed by a multi-level secure boot mechanism. However, attackers can still utilize the kernel module mechanism to load and execute malware code in the kernel space. This makes attacks on and tampering of the TrustZone driver possible. To solve this problem, we introduce a novel kernel real-time protection mechanism, in which all dynamically loaded kernel modules must have corresponding signature certificates. In addition, it is mandatory that all kernel modules be transferred to the secure world for signature authentication before they are loaded. Only the modules that pass the authentication can be loaded and executed.
Hardware Platform
In our scheme, the ARM SoC based on the ARM TrustZone technology is adopted at the bottom hardware layer. The secure element can be connected to the ARM SoC through SPI bus, and most present secure element chips can support this bus interface (as shown in Figure 3(a) ).
The AXI-to-APB bridge can ensure APB peripheral security access. The AXI-to-APB bridge contains a series of TZPCDECPROT input signals. These signals are used to determine if the peripheral is configured in the secure world (safe) or in the normal world (non-secure). The AXI-to-APB bridge must reject insecure transactions from the normal world and refuse to send these requests to the peripherals in the secure world. The TZPCDECPROT input signal for each peripheral is generated by the TrustZone Protection Controller (TZPC). TZPC provides a software interface to the protection bits in a secure system in a TrustZone design. It configures each area of memory as secure or non-secure and includes AMBA APB system interface. Current mainstream ARM SoCs can be configured to operate in the secure world after being powered on or reset. For the power on/reset state of TZPC configuration, all TZPCDECPORT input signals are set to 0. This means that all peripherals connected to are in the secure world, so the secure element belongs to the secure world. The whole system can rely on the secure element as the root of trust, and the bootloader can also rely on the secure element to handle sensitive information such as encryption and decryption.
Multilevel Secure Boot
As mentioned above, the bootloader image of connected devices may be cracked or replaced if the image is stored in the unprotected flash device. In our scheme, the first-stage bootloader is stored in the secure element to solve this problem. As shown in Figure 3(a) , the secure element can be connected to the ARM SoC through SPI bus. In addition, the boot mode of the ARM SoC can be configured by special settings such as the voltage of the specific pin input or eFUSE configurations. In this way, the boot device of the ARM SoC can be configured as a SPI flash device. Our software in the secure element can emulate a SPI flash device driver after the SE is powered on or reset. This allows the ARM SoC to read the first-stage bootloader from the secure element and then hand over the system control to it.
The first-stage bootloader begins to execute from the system exception level of Secure-EL3. Because secure elements often have limited storage space, the first-stage bootloader has some basic functions including determination of cold boot or warm boot, initialization of the platform architecture (mainly of secure world initialization, including initialization of vector table, CPU, MMU, and other control registers), initialization of serial port (UART0), loading and authenticating of the second-stage bootloader, and transferring of the system control right to it.
The second-stage bootloader is stored in the unprotected flash device, so it is of full function. The second-stage bootloader begins to execute from the system exception level of Secure-EL1. Functions realized by it include initialization of the platform architecture (including initialization of secure world and normal world), loading of the system images of system security monitors, trusted OS, and general-purpose OS.
As mentioned above, the whole system can rely on the secure element as the root of trust, and the secure element can ensure that its content cannot be illegal accessed and analyzed. Therefore, the first-stage bootloader stored in the secure element is considered trustworthy and can be executed directly. At the same time, other system images (such as the secondstage boot loader, trusted operating system, etc.) are all stored in the unprotected flash device, and verifying the integrity of these images has become a key issue. The UEFI forum introduces a chain of trust, which means starting from the root of the trust and verifying the integrity of each entity in the boot process in turn. If the entity is trusted, then it can verify the next execution entity.
In our scheme, digital signature technology is used for integrity verification, and every system image has its own digital certificate, except the first-stage bootloader. Before the system image is loaded by the current executing code, the certificate of the image needs to be loaded and verified. For example, the first-stage bootloader shall verify the certificate of the second-stage bootloader before loading it. The second-stage bootloader image cannot be loaded unless it passes the certificate verification. After the second-stage bootloader image is successfully loaded, it is considered trustworthy. Then, the first-stage bootloader will hand over the system control to it. The whole boot procedure of our scheme is shown in Figure 3 (b).
In our scheme, RSA (an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm) and SHA-1 (a hash algorithm) are used to generate the system image certificate, and the public and private keys pairs used to generate the certificate of each system image are not the same. In our scheme, the process of making public and private key pairs is integrated into the compilation process. At the same time, the public key corresponding to a certain image certificate will be integrated with the previous image file in the chain of trust. This previous image is responsible for loading and verifying this certain image.
During the compilation of each system image, its self-signed certificate will automatically be generated. Take the second-stage bootloader as an example. After the compilation is complete, the SHA-1 algorithm will be used to calculate the hash value of the image. Then, the hash value of the second-stage bootloader will be linked with the basic information of the certificate. The basic information of the certificate includes the validity date of the certificate, the issuer of the certificate, and the public key information. After that, the SHA-1 algorithm will be used to calculate the hash value of the certificate. The hash of the certificate information will be encrypted using the RSA algorithm further to obtain the digital signature of the certificate. Finally, both the digital signature and the certificate will be linked to generate the self-signed certificate (as shown in Figure 4(a) ).
The system image verification process is divided into two aspects. On the one hand, the public key needs to be verified to prevent the public key from being tampered with. On the other hand, before loading and executing an image, the previous image in the chain of trust needs to verify the integrity of the image to prevent the image that has been tampered with from gaining system control (as shown in Figure 4(b) ).
In the following, the public key authentication of the second-stage bootloader is used as an example to illustrate the process of verifying the public key. First, the public key stored in the second-stage bootloader certificate and the public key stored in the first-stage bootloader need to be separately extracted. Then, if the two values are the same, this means that the public key has not been modified, and the system can continue to perform the image integrity verification; otherwise, a system exception will occur.
The integrity verification of the image can be subdivided into two steps. The first step is to verify the integrity of the self-signed certificate itself. After the digital signature is decrypted with the public key, the hash value of the certificate is obtained, and then the current execution code will perform a hash calculation of the certificate information. If the two hash values are matched, the certificate has not been modified. The next step of image integrity verification can be performed. The second step is to verify the integrity of the image file itself. The result of hash calculation of the image is used to compare with the hash value extracted from the certificate. If the two hash values are the same, this means that the image has not been modified. The whole system image verification process is finally completed, and the image can be loaded and executed.
Reliable Trusted OS
The trusted OS not only needs to implement the common functions of the operating system, such as memory management and task management, but also needs to implement the standard functions that the GP specification requires for the TEE software environment to be implemented, such as the TEE Internal API, the TEE Client API, and the communication agent between CA and TA.
In general, the trusted OS needs to implement the following components:
1) The operating system kernel, which includes trusted devices drivers, memory management, and trusted application management.
2) Functions and application programming interface defined by GP specifications, such as cryptographic function, secure storage function, TEE Internal API, TEE Client API, TEE SE API, TEE Socket API, and TEE Trusted UI API.
3) The TEE Management Framework, which is responsible for the lifecycle management for both trusted applications and the trusted OS itself.
4) The communication agent responsible for communicating between the general-purpose OS and the trusted OS.
In addition, in order to increase the efficiency of large-scale data transmission between CA and TA, the share memory mechanism can be used to facilitate data transmission. Therefore, the trusted OS needs to implement the corresponding function to provide support for share memory mechanism.
The increasing complexity of the trusted OS will increase the likelihood of system vulnerabilities. Our scheme fully referred to the design thought of microkernel, innovatively realizing a new architecture trusted OS. Based on microkernel architecture, the trusted OS is divided into three parts: privileged mode trusted OS kernel, non-privileged mode system services, and trusted device drivers. Both system services and device drivers are non-privileged mode threads on the trusted OS kernel, and the kernel provides the isolation between threads. Simplification of privileged mode code and isolation between various components of trusted OS effectively improve the reliability of the operating system (as shown in Figure  2(b) ).
As mentioned above, if cryptographic operations are implemented in the Trusted OS using a software algorithm library, sensitive operations such as encryption and decryption in TEE have a certain risk of being compromised. In our scheme, those sensitive operations in TEE are implemented by the secure element's hardware capability to enhance reliability.
Conclusions
As mentioned earlier, the real-time protection of the Linux kernel is mainly reflected in the security protection of dynamically loaded kernel modules and the use of digital signature technology to prevent uncertified malicious kernel modules from being loaded into the kernel. Kernel modules are usually loaded into the Linux kernel dynamically through the insmod command. This is done with the system call SYSCALL_DEFINE3. In Linux kernel version 3.7 and later, the module signature check mechanism has been introduced, but this operation is performed in the REE environment and cannot guarantee security. In our scheme, the kernel module signature check mechanism is migrated to TEE to improve system reliability.
The insmod command first reads the kernel module file from the file system and maps it to the user memory address space, and then it further calls the init_module function to complete the user space to kernel space switch. Then, the SYSCALL_DEFINE3 system call is triggered. In Linux kernel code, it first checks whether dynamic loading of the module is allowed and checks if the current process has the permission to load a kernel module. In order to migrate kernel module verification operations to the TEE environment, we first need to request CA service through TA. However, TA is a user space program, so we use we use the call_usermodehelper mechanism to execute the user space program in the Linux kernel space.
The CA program reads the contents of the kernel module and places it in the share memory. Then, it switches to the security world to execute the TA program through the SMC call. The TA program verifies the kernel module and returns the result to the Linux kernel. According to the result, the Linux kernel chooses to continue loading the kernel module or refuses to load it (as shown in Figure 5 ). 
